SOUTHBOROUGH, Mass., April 22, 2014 /PRNewswire/ -- Lemelson Capital Management, LLC, a private investment manager, today announced that it has taken a significant equity position in Kulicke & Soffa Industries (NASDAQ: KLIC), a global leader in the design and manufacture of semiconductor and LED assembly equipment.
Lemelson Capital's acquisition reflects the firm's view that shares of the company remain dramatically undervalued.
Lemelson Capital also announced today that it is urging K&S to initiate a share repurchase plan and has delivered the following letter to the company's management team, board of directors and other stakeholders.
April 22, 2014
Mr. Bruno Guilmart President and Chief Executive Officer K&S Corporate Headquarters 23A Serangoon North Ave 5 #01-01 Singapore 554369
Congratulations on what can only be described as first-rate execution since taking over as CEO of Kulicke and Soffa Industries in 2010.
The firm's focus on transitioning to copper wire bonding proved timely while your and Jonathan's operational acumen appear to have contributed significantly to K & S's sizeable war chest of approximately $556 million and its near flawless balance sheet.
Additionally, your leadership team deserves much credit for achieving an important shift in corporate culture that has fueled higher employee morale while lowering turnover.
After following your progress over the years, Lemelson Capital on behalf of its clients has picked up some 368,429 shares over the last 14 months, increasing the positional size some 65 percent since YE 2013 alone, which is indicative of a firm conviction that the market continues to radically under-value the company and its future prospects.
Lemelson Capital intends to continue buying on behalf of its clients.
As you know, cash and cash equivalents now represent approximately 60 percent of the company's market capitalization. The wedge bonder business remains undervalued on the balance sheet and the flexible operating model that has been adopted has reduced OpEx when needed. Also, the steady, high margin expendable tools business combined with the absence of the convertible debt that was paid off in 2011 have worked to minimize the correlation in the share price to the overall semi-conductor industry cycles while "juicing" cash flow. As a result of these changes, short interest in K&S has never been lower.
At the same time, the thin analyst coverage the firm has received has been either dead-wrong in its appraisal of the firm's value or significantly under-estimated the Total Addressable Market going forward. All of this has contributed to the shares remaining unappreciated for a curiously long period of time.
However, the purpose of this letter is not only to recognize the recent achievements of management but also to express to you directly (with the expectation that you will in turn share this letter with the company's board of directors) Lemelson Capitals unwavering belief the time is long overdue for the company to authorize a sizeable (at least $250 million) share buy-back. While it is appreciated that a substantial part of K&S's cash is held off-shore, the company could easily use debt to finance such a repurchase at very favorable interest rates.
Lemelson Capital considers K&S to be one of its most important commitments, and to be abundantly clear is very much supportive of your leadership and strategy. The sole criticism outlined in this letter stems from the conspicuous absence of a significant buyback program.
There are two drivers of a share buyback, the first is that the current share price is absurdly low in relation to the company's intrinsic value.
Time is of the essence. Vivid price/value disparities, such as that occurring at the moment in the shares of K&S typically remain for but a short time, as the market eventually comes around to more or less correctly weighing the value of a growing balance sheet and an unusually high growth in per share book value (K&S's growth in per share book value has averaged a remarkable 36.3% over the last five years).
You have indicated in the past that you would like to reserve this abnormally large cash position for potential acquisitions, but this argument is increasingly losing merit, as the future of the company, which rests in large part on advanced packaging, has already developed its own next generation solution, with a commercially viable product, that is, by your own estimate just six to nine months away. Meanwhile the underlying wire bonding business has become a steady source of free cash flow that you acknowledge is easily projected many years into the future.
K&S currently holds roughly $556 million in cash and cash equivalents, while average free cash flow between 2010 and 2013 equaled 131 million. With 2014 EBITDA likely to approximate at least $85-100 million and future bonding technology emerging as a home-grown solution, it is becoming increasingly difficult to defend any further delay in initiating a large repurchase program.
The forward PE ratio of the S & P 500 is about 15.7. After backing out net cash, K&S trades at just 5.4 x conservative forward earnings estimates, this does not account for the company's 10% tax rate, which is significantly lower than that used by analysts in such calculations.
This (cash adjusted) discount becomes even more significant when viewed in terms of projected free cash flow. If future cash flows approximate the average of the last four years, then the cash-adjusted price to free cash flow ratio is just 2.9x. That is to say the company arguably may generate enough free cash flow in the next 2.9 years to cover its entire enterprise value.
With such a massive valuation gap and an inordinate amount of cash on the balance sheet, it is difficult to understand why the board would not act now to aggressively buy back stock by immediately announcing a tender offer for at least 250 million (financed with either debt or a mix of debt and cash). K&S generates more than enough cash flow to service such an amount.
For example, if the company decided to borrow the full $250 million to commence a buyback at $12 per share, the result would be a reduction of 20.8 million or ~28% of the shares outstanding. This in turn would result in a ~38% lift to earnings per share (based on 2013's anomalously low earnings), and a commensurate 38% increase in the value of the shares. This conservative math assumes no multiple expansion of the forward PE or the ridiculously low P/FCF ratio outlined above.
In the not too distant future, if such a buyback were executed, today's forward (and conservative) EPS estimates of just 89 cents per share would grow to $1.23 based on a reduced ~55 million share count. It seems reasonable to expect that with these enlarged figures the share price would appreciate beyond $19 if the market prices the shares at approximately the same forward multiple as the S & P 500 (a multiple at any rate substantially lower than the company's peers).
The second driver of a share repurchase, is the perpetual dilution of long-term owners in order to compensate management
Management teams that insist on holding large amounts of cash typically do so out of a fear that they will not be able to effectively compete in the future based on ability. This widely understood premise, when taken with management's perpetual stock sales, is sending a message (perhaps wrongly) to owners both existing and prospective.
It is also worth pointing out that management's shares sales have unfailingly excluded management from participating in gains as the price of the shares has risen steadily over the years. This pattern of share issuance and near immediate selling (perhaps perceived as de-risking) is being done at the expense of ongoing owners, indicating that while management's operational ability is solid, it appears to have little understanding of how to properly value a security. Needless to say, this has serious implications when discussing an election to repurchase shares.
Delaying the execution of a buyback any further will only serve to validate this point.
Ideally, management would keep its financial interests significantly aligned with that of long-term owners, particularly in light of the highly undervalued nature of the shares. However, if management insists on selling as quickly as options vest, then at a minimum the board must act quickly to mitigate the resultant damage caused to long-term owners.
A significant component of the board's responsibilities is to be aware of occasions to increase owner-shareholder value. There are few things the board could do at this time that would be more effective than to implement a large and well-timed buyback.
Commencing the proposed buyback will likely result in considerable stock appreciation of at least 60% for owners who choose not to sell into the proposed tender offer. Lemelson Capital can be counted as first amongst those committed to long-term ownership.
+ Emmanuel Lemelson Chief Investment Officer Lemelson Capital Management, LLC
About Lemelson Capital Management
Lemelson Capital Management, LLC is a private investment management firm focused on deep value and special situation investments. The firm is based in Southborough, MA. For more information, see: http://www.lemelsoncapital.com
For further information please contact:
+ Emmanuel Lemelson Chief Investment Officer Lemelson Capital Management, LLC Telephone: 508-485-0607
SPECIAL NOTE REGARDING THIS LETTER
THIS LETTER INCLUDES INFORMATION BASED ON DATA FOUND IN FILINGS WITH THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, INDEPENDENT INDUSTRY PUBLICATIONS AND OTHER SOURCES. ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE THAT THE DATA IS RELIABLE, WE HAVE NOT SOUGHT, NOR HAVE WE RECEIVED, PERMISSION FROM ANY THIRD-PARTY TO INCLUDE THEIR INFORMATION IN THIS PRESENTATION. MANY OF THE STATEMENTS IN THIS PRESENTATION REFLECT OUR SUBJECTIVE BELIEF.
THE INFORMATION CONTAINED ABOVE IS NOT AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS INVESTMENT ADVICE, AND DOES NOT PURPORT TO BE AND DOES NOT EXPRESS ANY OPINION AS TO THE PRICE AT WHICH THE SECURITIES OF KULICKE AND SOFFA MAY TRADE AT ANY TIME. THE INFORMATION AND OPINIONS PROVIDED ABOVE SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS SPECIFIC ADVICE ON THE MERITS OF ANY INVESTMENT DECISION. INVESTORS SHOULD MAKE THEIR OWN DECISIONS REGARDING KULICKE AND SOFFA AND ITS PROSPECTS BASED ON SUCH INVESTORS' OWN REVIEW OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION AND SHOULD NOT RELY ON THE INFORMATION CONTAINED ABOVE. NEITHER Lemelson Capital NOR ANY OF its AFFILIATES ACCEPTS ANY LIABILITY WHATSOEVER FOR ANY DIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL LOSS HOWSOEVER ARISING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, FROM ANY USE OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED ABOVE.
Certain statements contained in this letter are forward-looking statements including, but not limited to, statements that are predications of or indicate future events, trends, plans or objectives. Undue reliance should not be placed on such statements because, by their nature, they are subject to known and unknown risks and uncertainties. Forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future performance or activities and are subject to many risks and uncertainties. Due to such risks and uncertainties, actual events or results or actual performance may differ materially from those reflected or contemplated in such forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements can be identified by the use of the future tense or other forward-looking words such as "believe," "expect," "anticipate," "intend," "plan," "estimate," "should," "may," "will," "objective," "projection," "forecast," "management believes," "continue," "strategy," "position" or the negative of those terms or other variations of them or by comparable terminology.
Important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from the expectations set forth in this letter include, among other things, the factors identified under the section entitled "Risk Factors" in Kulicke and Soffa's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended September 28, 2013. Such forward-looking statements should therefore be construed in light of such factors, and Lemelson Capital is under no obligation, and expressly disclaims any intention or obligation, to update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, except as required by law.
 Per share book value is used in this instance due to the steady issuance that brought diluted shares outstanding from 68.6 million FYE 2004 to 76.2 million by FYE 2013 – an increase of just over 11%.
 That is to say beyond holding merely 2-3x annual salary in shares.
 This is especially true in cases where stock grants continuously dilute existing and ongoing owners
SOURCE Lemelson Capital Management, LLC