NSSA's Moorman Center for Space Studies Releases New Occasional Paper: Military Requirements for Golden Dome Homeland Defense (Part 2)

WASHINGTON, April 24, 2025 /PRNewswire/ -- Military requirements will drive initial implementation of President Trump's "Golden Dome for America." In this new Occasional Paper, NSSA's Moorman Center for Space Studies Chair, Chris Williams, posits a set of national assets that should be defended via the Golden Dome air and missile defense system and describes how even limited defenses will contribute to U.S. national security.

In August 1951, a group of American scientific experts, tasked with developing a strategy to defend the nation against the threat posed by Soviet bombers, produced a report for U.S. military leaders. Entitled "Problems of Air Defense: Final Report of PROJECT CHARLES", the report had a significant impact on U.S. air defense technology development, operational strategies, organizational alignment, and funding through the 1950s. Among other noteworthy findings and recommendations, the report stated:

It is easy to assert that the United States can engage in warfare without protecting its vital military and industrial installations. It is much more difficult to state how much protection will be obtained at a given level of expenditure. We do not believe that the results of future air warfare are quantitatively predictable. The problem, as we see it, is to develop the best system of air defense that the country can provide with the funds available. Within such limits, great improvements are feasible by correcting known weaknesses and exploiting technological advances…. With the technical improvements that have been outlined, the warning, control, and weapon systems can be expected to inflict heavy damage on an enemy bombing force attacking the United States.¹

The PROJECT CHARLES report should be required reading by Department of Defense (DoD) officials tasked with designing and fielding the Golden Dome homeland air and missile defense system that President Donald J. Trump directed by Executive Order. ²

In a recent op-ed, Dr. Peppi DeBiaso and I described increasing threats to the homeland and offered recommendations for how to adapt the military requirements process within the Department of Defense to ensure the rapid fielding of key elements of Golden Dome. Specifically, we recommended that:

DoD leaders should reject the traditional requirements process, which involves establishing detailed performance specifications for a system that will be fielded years in the future and instead embrace a more agile and flexible approach…. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine should direct adoption of an incremental approach to requirements that lays out achievable objectives for each of the four homeland defense "epochs" proposed by the Missile Defense Agency…. A "build a little, test a lot, and refine and upgrade as deployments expand" strategy would allow technology developments and test results to inform decisions as to which combinations of capabilities should be fielded and at what pace and scale. [This] incremental approach is entirely consistent with the President's direction to DoD to establish and leverage "capabilities- based requirements" for Golden Dome. It also presents an opportunity to fully embrace agile acquisition authorities that are often talked about but sparingly implemented.³

The remainder of this paper will focus on the equally important topic of which targets should be defended as part of Golden Dome.

There are several target categories that merit protection from the Golden Dome air and missile defense system. These include:

• The American People. The Government's first priority is and must remain defense of the American people. For the foreseeable future, defenses cannot and will not take the place of strategic offensive forces in deterring large-scale attacks on the United States from Russia or China. That being said, even modest air and missile defenses can provide a measure of protection against and help deter limited attacks on the homeland.
   
• U.S. Nuclear Forces. U.S. homeland air and missile defenses will bolster the survivability of U.S. nuclear forces and complicate adversary attack strategies, thereby strengthening deterrence.
   
• Leadership. Assuring the survival of the President, Secretary of Defense, and other senior U.S. Government leaders should be a prime objective of Golden Dome. Enhancing defenses against adversary attacks aimed at "decapitating" the U.S. political and military leadership will bolster deterrence, increase the likelihood of a timely and effective U.S. response, and enhance the credibility of America's retaliatory threats.
   
• NC3. Strengthening the survivability of U.S. nuclear command control & communications (NC3), including ground-, sea-, air- and space-based systems, facilities and networks that contribute to NC3, must be a requirement for U.S. air and missile defenses. Assuring the President's ability to maintain effective command and control over and communicate with U.S. nuclear forces will serve as a powerful disincentive to adversary attacks on the homeland.
   
• Military Bases, Ports and Airfields. Defense of military and civilian airfields and ports are urgently needed given the key role they play in housing, mobilizing and transporting troops, storing equipment, and shipping vital supplies to overseas locations as well as the distribution of supplies and other materiel in domestic emergency scenarios.
   
• Critical Infrastructures and Industrial Production Capacity. An increasingly effective air and missile defense of U.S. critical infrastructures and industrial production capacity is likewise an imperative. The U.S. Government has formally designated sixteen critical infrastructure sectors including transportation, information technology, defense industrial base, emergency services, and more.⁴ Bolstering the defense of these infrastructures and industrial production capacity will enhance national resilience.
   
• Military Forces Deployed Abroad. U.S. military forces deployed abroad are prime targets of adversary air and missile attacks, as we have witnessed in the Mideast. The Golden Dome system must be capable of further enhancing the defense of U.S. forward-deployed forces and assets as well as U.S. friends and allies, whether in Europe, the Mideast, Asia or other locations.
   
• Civilian Targets. Terrorists, extremist groups, and other bad actors will likely seek to use manned and unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to kill Americans and target high profile events and facilities, thereby sowing fear among the U.S. citizenry and impacting the economy.

Key attributes of a Golden Dome capability should include redundancy for effective defense of high-value targets, defense-in-depth that assures several opportunities to engage and defeat individual threats, and multiple layers including ground-, air-, sea- and space-based defenses – each of which contribute uniquely to complicating adversary attack planning, bolstering deterrence, and defending against attacks, should deterrence fail.

It would be a grave mistake to set too high a bar for the requirements associated with initial Golden Dome deployments. Indeed, a Golden Dome air and missile defense system-of-systems that provides even modest protection across the aforementioned target categories would be a major contributor to U.S. national security. In addition, initial limited deployments together with robust testing can help inform future requirements as well as provide valuable data to guide architectural trade studies (eg, determining the proper mix of ground-, air-, sea- and space-based interceptors and sensors).

Finally, it is worth underscoring that the Golden Dome system need not be perfect in order to contribute promptly and meaningfully to U.S. national security. Opponents will offer stale arguments that only "leakproof" defenses are of value and because 100 percent effectiveness cannot be assured, it is not worth pursuing homeland air and missile defense. This argument was never convincing. No other military system is held to that impossible standard. Furthermore, remaining defenseless invites attacks on the homeland and broader aggression by America's increasingly well-armed adversaries.

Today's civilian and military leaders who have been assigned the weighty responsibility of designing, developing, fielding and operating the Golden Dome system can take heart in knowing that prior generations wrestled with the thorny problem of how best to defend the homeland – and did not back down from the challenge. As the authors of the PROJECT CHARLES report wisely noted, "A strong air defense is costly in terms of men as well as in dollars, but it is a necessary element of military strength."

Indeed. Now, nearly seventy-five years later, it's time to get on with "correcting known weaknesses and exploiting technological advances" for effective air and missile defense of the homeland.

Chris Williams serves as Chair of the Moorman Center for Space Studies, the independent think tank of the National Security Space Association.

NSSA is the only U.S. trade association dedicated solely to promoting the health and vitality of the U.S. national security space enterprise (Title 10 and Title 50) and its supporting industry partners. For more information, including how to join the Association, please visit us at www.nssaspace.org.

¹  "Problems of Air Defense: Final Report of PROJECT CHARLES", Massachusetts Institute of Technology, August 1, 1951 http://www.bitsavers.org/pdf/mit/lincolnLaboratory/project_charles/A800165_Final_Report_of_Project_Charles_Vol_1_Aug1951.pdf
²  "The Iron Dome for America", President Donald J. Trump, The White House, January 27, 2025 https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/the-iron-dome-for-america/
³  "Setting Military Requirements for Golden Dome", Chris Williams and Peppi DeBiaso, Real Clear Defense, April 17, 2025 https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/04/17/setting_military_requirements_for_golden_dome_1104625.html
⁴  "Critical Infrastructure Sectors", Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, Department of Homeland Security https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors

SOURCE National Security Space Association