Hop-A-Jet Calls for Stronger FAA Action After NTSB Final Report Links Fatal Challenger 604 Accident to Undetected Engine Corrosion

Operator Says Proposed Airworthiness Directive is a Critical Step, But Must Close Inspection Gaps That Left Crews and Operators Without Clear Corrosion-detection Safeguards

FORT LAUDERDALE, Fla., June 16, 2026 /PRNewswire/ -- Hop-A-Jet Worldwide Jet Charter today called for strengthened federal action on engine corrosion prevention following the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), Docket No. FAA-2026-3875, for certain GE CF34 engines. The private jet operator submitted comments to the FAA during the comment period which ended on June 15, 2026, calling for the agency to close inspection gaps that leave crews and operators without clear corrosion-detection safeguards.

"We believe that this AD is not only necessary to protect the lives of passengers and crew, but that it must be made even stronger to close the loopholes, gaps, and reporting issues that can allow safety to be compromised," said Hop-A-Jet CEO Barry Ellis. "Without these measures, countless aircraft may be at a growing risk of corrosion-related safety events. No one should have to deal with this kind of preventable tragedy in the future."

The FAA's proposed Airworthiness Directive was issued in response to an April 23, 2026, final report published by the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) which identified engine corrosion as the probable cause of a Feb. 9, 2024, fatal accident involving Bombardier Challenger 604 aircraft N823KD which suffered dual-engine failure on final approach to Naples, Florida.

The NTSB investigation determined that corrosion of both engines' variable geometry (VG) system components led to near-simultaneous sub-idle rotating compressor stalls, resulting in a loss of thrust in both engines, followed by an off-airport emergency landing. The two pilots were able to land the aircraft on an active roadway but were fatally injured when the plane struck a road sign and spun into a retaining wall. The cabin attendant and two passengers survived, escaping through a rear door.

As part of the FAA's proposed rulemaking, Hop-A-Jet submitted comments in support of the FAA's proposed action requiring borescope inspection of the high-pressure compressor case for corrosion. However, the company is urging the FAA to go further by ensuring that visual corrosion inspections are mandatory, auditable, and not subject to optional compliance pathways that could leave affected engines without direct inspection of the areas now known to be safety-critical.

"This accident raises a question every operator, regulator, and manufacturer should be asking: If corrosion was visible in the engine's internal compressor case area, why was it not identified and reported before the accident?," said Tim Rounds, Director of Maintenance for Hop-A-Jet Worldwide Jet Charter. "If the prior borescope inspection was not intended to detect corrosion, then what corrosion-detection program was in place to protect crews, passengers and the public?"

Hop-A-Jet's comments also express support for the FAA to require reinspection of engines previously inspected under engine manufacturer's Service Bulletin revisions that allowed compliance without performing a borescope inspection of the relevant compressor case areas.

Hop-A-Jet's formal comments further urge the FAA to account for sea/salt operating environments, require reporting of corrosion findings, shorten follow-up variable geometry system functional check intervals when active corrosion is found, and require maintenance manual and flight manual revisions that clearly distinguish a hung start from a slow start.

"The industry cannot rely on operators to detect a condition they were not clearly told existed and were not positioned to inspect themselves," Rounds said. "These specialized engine borescope inspections are performed by the manufacturer or manufacturer-authorized vendors under manufacturer instructions. A maintenance program must tell those inspectors where to look, what condition to identify, when to report it, and what action is required when corrosion is found. Anything less leaves too much uncertainty in a system where uncertainty can have catastrophic consequences."

In its submission to the NTSB, Hop-A-Jet stated that the company learned only after the accident that archived borescope imagery from prior inspections showed visible corrosion around variable geometry vane bore holes that was not reported to the operator. Hop-A-Jet emphasized that these specialized engine borescope inspections are not performed by the operator. They are performed by the engine manufacturer or manufacturer-authorized vendors, following the manufacturer's inspection instructions and criteria. That distinction is central to the safety issue: if the manufacturer's inspection program did not require corrosion to be identified, reported and escalated, the operator had no practical way to know the condition existed.

Hop-A-Jet is asking federal regulators and manufacturers to address what it views as the central unresolved safety issue: how operators were expected to identify internal compressor corrosion affecting the variable geometry system if maintenance instructions did not clearly require corrosion inspection, reporting and corrective action.

The FAA's proposed airworthiness directive applies to certain GE CF34-1A, CF34-3A, CF34-3A1, CF34-3A2 and CF34-3B engines. The FAA states the unsafe condition, if not addressed, could result in loss of engine thrust control and reduced control of the airplane.

Hop-A-Jet said its requested changes are practical, safety-driven and intended to prevent recurrence across the affected fleet.

"This is not about assigning blame," Rounds said. "It is about ensuring that no crew, operator or passenger is ever again placed in a position where a known safety-critical condition exists inside an engine but the inspection system does not clearly require that it be found, reported and acted upon."

Hop-A-Jet's Requested FAA Actions Include:

Requiring visual borescope inspection of the affected HPC case and VGV bore areas for corrosion, including reinspection where prior compliance did not include that inspection, and ensuring that manufacturer-authorized inspection providers are required to identify, document and report corrosion findings to operators and regulators.

Adding sea/salt environment exposure as a risk factor Independent of annual utilization thresholds.

Requiring reporting of corrosion findings so the FAA, manufacturers and operators can understand the prevalence and severity of the condition across the fleet.

Mandating more frequent variable geometry system functional checks when active corrosion is detected.

Requiring maintenance manual revisions that specifically instruct technicians to inspect compressor case and VGV bore areas for corrosion.

Requiring affected flight manuals and operating manuals to clearly distinguish a hung start from a slow start and prohibit continued operation after a hung start without maintenance troubleshooting.

About Hop-A-Jet Worldwide Jet Charter

Hop-A-Jet Worldwide Jet Charter, Inc., doing business as Ace Aviation, is an FAA-certificated Part 135 on-demand charter operator based at Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport. For more than five decades, Hop-A-Jet has provided private aviation services with a focus on safety, operational discipline and client service.

Hop-A-Jet Media Contact

Charles Knauf
Hop-A-Jet Worldwide Jet Charter
954.771.5779 X 268, [email protected]

SOURCE Hop-A-Jet Worldwide Jet Charter